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Abstract   This paper investigates the effect of positive marginal monitoring
and enforcement costs, ‘policing cost,’ on the optimal exploitation of a fishery
under the management of a marine protected area. It is shown that with positive
marginal policing cost, the objective of maximum economic yield is no longer
optimal, and that some dissipation of economic rent is socially optimal. The rel-
evance of environmental education, the efficacy of policing, and the weightiness
of punishments to optimal rent dissipation is discussed. Relevance of the model
to other fisheries institutions is claimed.
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Introduction
Many marine scientists think that enough is known about marine biology for the sci-
entific siting of marine protected areas (MPAs).1 To select from a large literature,
Ward, Heinemann, and Evans (2001) review 89 research papers and claim this for
‘high topographic’ areas, such as coral reefs. Auster and Shackell (2000) claim it for
‘low topography areas’ as, for example, in the Gulf of Maine. Ward, Heinemann,
and Evans (2001) point to scientific evidence on a “reserve effect,” a “spillover ef-
fect,” and an “export effect” of MPAs. The “reserve effect” occurs within an MPA.
The improved habitat offered by protection from invasive fishing activity has been
recorded to cause greater spawning, settlement, and larval and juvenile survival;
lower fish mortality; and greater mean age, density, biomass, and reproductive po-
tential. Resulting from these is also a “stability effect” that takes the form of re-
duced yield variability and chances of population crashes. Translating these
biological-physical effects into economic terms, economic values within an MPA are
known to increase in ‘before-after’ comparisons. The “spillover effect” is in the
form of a net movement of larvae, young fish, and adults out of an MPA that causes
increased local fish density and local fish catches. The export effect is the scientific
basis of the “source-sink” model developed below. The “export effect” refers to the
net outward movement of larvae such that there is increased regional recruitment
and increased regional catch. As both the spillover and export effects potentially in-
crease economic values outside of an MPA, there is an external economy from one
geographic area to another. Bellwood and Hughes’ (2001) research on coral reefs de-
scribes the large scale of the export effect. They find that the most important predic-
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tor of diversity in coral and fish species on the coral reefs was the incidence of suit-
able reef habitats within 600 km of the site—biological spatial interconnectedness
being maintained by the movement of fish and plankton (see Knowlton [2001] and
references therein). Auster and Shackell (2000) survey research on temperate and
boreal low topography demersal fish assemblages in the northwest Atlantic. They
conclude that these zoological assemblages can be stable in both oceanic space and
over time; although they note that assemblage boundaries can change if the taxa are
disturbed by exogenous events, such as overfishing or changes in ocean conditions
such as water temperature. Nevertheless, they claim that “fish assemblage bound-
aries can serve as the primary filter for selection of MPA sites” (p. 423). They also
identify other site selection markers. Thus, in order to promote the development of a
wider ecosystem than just one or a few target species, sites should be chosen as far
as possible with mixed ocean floors (sand, rock, gravel, cohesive sediments) with
the aim of maximizing both the number of species included and species interactions.
Moreover, Auster and Shackell (2000) say that there is a case for setting some MPAs
over spawning areas and were juveniles congregate.
Recently several bioeconomic models of MPAs have been developed largely
concerned with the simulating effects of MPAs on biomass inside a no-take zone,
and whether aggregate harvests will increase or diminish following the introduction
of a closed zone (Beattie et al. 2002; Boncoeur et al. 2002; Hannesson 1998; Hol-
land 2000; Holland and Brazee 1996; Pezzey, Roberts, and Urdal 2000; Polacheck
1990; Rodwell et al. 2002; Sanchirico and Wilen 1999, 2001, 2002; Smith and
Wilen 2003). It is acknowledged in this literature that a desirable objective of an
MPA is to maximize economic fishery rent in the oceanic space adjacent to a closed
zone; i.e., to attain maximum economic yield (MEY) in the remaining ‘open’ areas.
Several economic studies acknowledge that MPAs need to be policed and that
enforcement costs will be incurred (Hall, Hall, and Murray 2002; Milon 2000; Na-
tional Research Council 2001; Pezzey, Roberts, and Urdal 2000; and Polacheck
1990). Acknowledgement of policing costs changes the objective function from
straightforward maximization of economic rent, to maximization of economic rent
net of policing cost. This paper offers what I think is the first model of an MPA in
which the objective function is used to maximize this latter function. As Homans and
Wilen (1997) observe, to understand fisheries management it is important not only
to consider the underlying marine biology, but also to examine the dynamics that
may exist between a fishery and other economic and biological values that may be
contained in an MPA and the regulatory apparatus. This paper is an attempt to do so.
Given the vastness of oceanic space that may have to be policed—the Great
Barrier Reef Marine Park is approximately the size of California—policing costs are
not necessarily trivial. Policing can also be presumed to become more complicated
and costly when an MPA encompasses more than just two zones. Indeed, NMFS
(2003) points out that policing costs may even depend on the shape of an MPA, with
straight-line boundaries being easiest to police. Policing costs as a positive function
of the number of zones that a larger area is divided into is assumed in Demsetz
(1967), a seminal paper on zoned property rights, and Field (1989). Farrow (1996)
and Sanchirico and Wilen (2002) discuss the idea of the equalization of social costs
of invasive human activities between defined areas of oceanic space within a
‘greater’ MPA.2 It is also worthwhile mentioning that policing costs have been fea-
tured in the International Whaling Agreement to the effect that it was deemed so
costly to place monitors on each whaling boat, that effective monitoring of catch
2 There may also be a case for buffer zones so that genuine mistakes by fishers and other human users of
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was difficult or impossible. In other words, policing costs are known to influence
choices over oceanic governance arrangements.
As mentioned above, it is an open question whether the introduction of a no-
take zone increases or reduces aggregate harvests. Even as harvests in the open zone
increase, they may not increase enough to offset harvests lost to the closed zone. In
this paper, it is simply assumed that economic rent in the open zone (or zones) in-
creases at some point in time following the creation of an MPA, and that the objec-
tive is the maximization of this economic rent subject to policing cost.3 However,
the aggregate harvest issue is an interesting one for the policing cost issue in a
broader context than the one investigated in this paper. Thus, if one sets an objective
of maximizing economic rent net of policing cost from the entirety of oceanic space
(say out to a sovereign’s 200-mile exclusive economic zone—where it has the legal
right to police), the matter of choice between governance regimes becomes the cen-
tral issue. Such an analysis might show that an individual transferable quota-cum-
policing model yields higher social value than does an MPA-cum-policing model.
However, this type of evaluation is much more ambitious than is attempted here,
where our attention is focused on understanding how policing costs may affect so-
cial returns from an MPA.
Consideration of the economic value of oceanic policing activity must distin-
guish between rent dissipation through legal and illegal activities. The well-docu-
mented practices of capital stuffing, high grading, and derby fishing that are
associated with management practices, such as the use of shortened fishing seasons
and fishing quotas, are legal ways in which economic rents are known to be dissi-
pated (OECD 1997). Policing against such legal activities does not arise. However,
economic rents may be protected, and perhaps should be protected, through institu-
tional arrangements that, if properly policed, are not necessarily subjected to rent
dissipation. Included among these are zoning prohibitions and the creation of prop-
erty rights in oceanic resources.4
In the following discussion, what is optimized is policing expenditure against il-
legal rent dissipation activities—“poaching” for short. Thus, a critical assumption in
the following analysis is prior (or at least simultaneous) introduction of rent-sustain-
ing institutional devices that, with effective policing, actually sustain marine re-
source economic rents. A theoretical result derived in the following analysis is that
in the presence of positive marginal policing costs, maximization of economic yield
(MEY) is not the correct objective. Rather, the correct objective is to maximize sus-
tainable economic rent net of policing cost.5
3 Choice of a social welfare function is, of course, fraught with controversy – not least in the context of
the governance of fisheries where ‘stakeholder’ interests are often to the fore. This paper simply accepts
the notion that is widely, if not universally, accepted in fisheries economics that the attainment of a so-
cial optimum, such as MEY, is desirable. An increase in aggregate harvests following the introduction of
a no-take zone is helpful in that a Pareto improvement in stakeholders’ welfare is at least possible.
Based on the calibrated simulation model of Holland (2000), actual Pareto improvement is doubtful, as
fishers are likely to be differentially impacted by area closures; i.e., those harboring near a closed area
having further to travel to the open fishing grounds.
4 The creation of property rights is not uncontroversial (Macinko and Bromley [2002]). Giving away
property rights may be socially unfair when at least some fishers already have high levels of income or
wealth. The creation of property rights might also preclude the introduction of more efficient or socially
acceptable fisheries institutions at a later date.
5 It is assumed that the size of an MPA is determined either as a political bargain between stakeholders
or it is governed by biological factors. Biological factors suggest that an MPA needs to be between 20 and
70% of a fishing ground (Sumaila 2002; Ward, Heinemann, and Evans 2001). In Kenchington (1990) and
Boersma and Parrish (1999), the appropriate size of an MPA depends upon site fidelity and site dispersal.
Corals, for example, have high site fidelity, but depending on ocean currents, large dispersal ranges. An
MPA should target at least one of these. In the bioeconomic model of Holland and Brazee (1996), opti-
mal reserve size is stated, though not modeled, as that which maximizes the present value of harvests.Hallwood 484
The Basic Economic Model
The following economic examination of MPAs is concerned with several factors,
namely the case for no-take zones and spatially graduated admission of human ac-
tivities, the effect of zoning on sustainable economic rents, and the optimal policing
of an MPA. To analyze these factors, a simple model is developed based upon the
following equation:
V = f(x, h)  fx < 0, fh < 0, (1)
where V is the monetary value of sustainable economic rent available from a well-
sited, well-managed MPA. The term x signifies distance from the center of a no-take
zone, which is itself sited in the center of the MPA, and h is the rate of a pre-defined
human activity, say, fishing using a given technique.
The negative signs on the partial derivatives, fx and fh, indicate, respectively, that
sustainable rent falls as distance from the center of an MPA increases, and that
higher rates of human activity degrade economic rent. The first of these assumptions
is consistent with the biological studies cited earlier, in that biological spillovers
from a no-take zone decline with distance. Also, it is a matter of common observa-
tion that fh < 0, namely that overfishing degrades economic rent.6
The economic analysis of the features described by equation (1) proceeds se-
quentially beginning with how the impact of human activity, in combination with
oceanic biological conditions, makes restricted zoned access rational economic
policy.
Zoning
The economic case for zoning activities, banning some or all human activities from
specific area, follows from non-convexity in the production possibility frontier
(Helfand and Rubin 1994). Thus, a pair of activities is incompatible when the oppor-
tunity cost of one, measured in terms of what is given up of the other, falls. An ex-
ample is trawling and the richness of an ocean floor habitat. Even one pass of a
trawler can so substantially destroy a rich habitat as to render it almost worthless
from an ecological point of view (Auster and Shackell 2000). A similar non-convex-
ity can also exist between coral reef habitat and tourism, since the constant dropping
of anchors and taking of specimens can substantially degrade a reef.
Given declining marginal social cost of an activity, the job of a zoning board,
using some sort of estimate of willingness to pay, is to determine the appropriate al-
location of a given tract between incompatible activities. A corner solution would be
to separate incompatible activities to different zones. This is exactly what has hap-
pened in the ocean zoning of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park (Day 2002), where
there is a fine separation of human activities into six distinct zones. It is also the
case with many other MPAs around the world where, for example, all fishing activ-
ity is banned within a defined zone while regulated fishing, or even open access, is
allowed outside that zone.
Using equation (1), the case for zoning can be modeled as an attempt by
policymakers to equate the marginal social cost of a given human activity across
6 The negative effect of the given human activity on sustainable rent could be modeled to occur only
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ocean space. As mentioned before, fh < 0 signifies that a given human activity destroys
sustainable rent. Therefore, dV/dh measures the marginal social cost of the given human
activity. Marginal social cost can be assumed to vary according to spatial variations
in oceanic conditions. For example, trawling in an area that badly affects ocean
floor habitat will have a higher social cost than in an area where natural habitat con-
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where the superscript designates a numbered zone. If the objective is to minimize
the total social cost of a human activity, or to accept some given amount of sustain-
able rent degradation, maintenance of the inequalities in equation (2) is not rational
policy.8 Rather, the human activity should be shunted out of those zones where its
marginal social cost, measured by dVi/dh, is relatively high to where it is lower, so
reducing the total social cost of the activity. Such a policy of regulated access re-
quires monitoring and policing and, presumably, the greater the number of different
types of zones that have to be policed, the greater policing costs will be. This is es-
pecially so when different types of human activities are allowed/disallowed in dif-
ferent zones.
Modeling a Rent Bubble
In this section, attention turns to the modeling of sustainable economic rent, and the
economic consequences of biological spillovers. There are several ways to model
the economic consequence of an MPA with associated biological and economic
spillovers. A simple source-sink model is used here to illustrate the main points.
In figure 1, distance from the center of a closed zone is measured on the x-axis,
and rent per square unit area (say, per acre) of ocean floor is measured in dollars on
the y-axis. The function f(x) measures sustainable economic rent per unit area as de-
pending on absolute distance from the center of the closed zone. This declining
function is consistent with the assumption that the value of spillovers from the
closed zone declines with distance. In equation (1), fx < 0. It should be emphasized
that figure 1 represents a cross section through the center of a “designated geo-
graphic area” shown in figure 2, which is drawn circular only to simplify the calcu-
lations below. The function f(x) can be thought of as the outer edge of a “bubble” of
sustainable economic rent that exists in three-dimensional space with its highest
point centered over the origin.
The rate of economic rent, f(x), is sustainable in the sense that human users can
obtain it period after period. For example, rent is sustainable if fishers take only the
annual growth in biomass, or, if hobbyist divers do not interfere with the oceanic
objects that they view.
As the baseline case, suppose that the designated geographic area in figure 2 is
inefficiently managed initially to the extent that fishers and other human users of it
7 Sanchirico and Wilen (1999) state that fishers will equate marginal rents between areas outside a
closed zone. However, they were referring to private economic rents. The argument for zoning here is
based on inequality between social values, and these will not necessarily be equalized by unregulated
fishing activity.
8 This statement ignores the policing cost considerations discussed elsewhere in this paper.Hallwood 486
Figure 1.  Potential Sustainable Economic Benefits of a Closed Zone
Figure 2.  Designated Area with a Central Closed Zone
Note: Inner circle in bold represents a closed zone. Inner broken line circle marks the outer boundary of
a restricted zone. Remainder of area is unzoned.
reduce economic rent everywhere to zero. This assumption is consistent with the
theory of the open-access fishery as discussed by Gordon (1954), and is assumed in
many of the bioeconomic models cited earlier. It is also approximately consistent
with the analysis of fisheries that use a total allowable catch (TAC) in combination
with fishing restrictions, such as of type of gear, number of boats, or workers per
boat. Thus, in order to capture the increased economic rents afforded by the catch
limit, fishers engage in rent destroying practices, such as capital stuffing and derby
fishing (OECD 1997).Protected Areas, Optimal Policing and Optimal Rent Dissipation 487
In order to increase economic rent from the baseline (zero) level, a closed zone
is introduced over a biologically productive area chosen on the basis of the consid-
erations discussed earlier. In figure 1, the distance 0x1 indicates the closed zone. It is
assumed that, with time, the biological productivity of the closed zone increases, ul-
timately to its maximum monetary level, IMAX. Such an assumption is consistent with
the relevant field studies discussed by Ward, Heinemann, and Evans (2001).
An observed problem with closed zones that are not accompanied with other
zoning measures is that fishers will fish intensively right up to the edge of the
closed zone. This is an example of “fishery displacement” by fishers excluded from
the no-take zone and is a familiar assumption in bioeconomic models. Such inten-
sive fishing effort (and possibly other human activities such as diving and anchor
damage) destroys the potential sustainable economic rent beyond x1. If this is the
case, the rent profile becomes IMAXAx1x2, which is obviously less than it could be
along f(x).
While the managers of some fisheries appear to be content with this state of af-
fairs, others are not. Thus, U.S. authorities governing the Gulf of Maine off the
northeastern U.S. coast allow fishing right up to the boundary of the closed zones,
but in Australia’s Great Barrier Reef Marine Park, closed zones may be further pro-
tected by adjacent restricted zones (Day 2002). Such a restricted zone is shown in
figure 1 as the distance x1 to x2. As a matter of policy, the objective of the restricted
zone is to preserve as much of the sustainable economic rent as possible, subject to
a policing cost constraint (as discussed later). Accordingly, some human activities
are allowed in the restricted zone, but not others. Such zoning restrictions are con-
sistent with equation (2) and later discussion.
We are interested in the maximum amount of sustainable economic rent; i.e.,
MEY, created in the restricted zone through biological and associated economic
spillovers from the closed zone. To find this, we need to calculate the volume, V,
which is a monetary measure of sustainable economic rent, created under f(x) be-
tween x1 and x2 rotated around the y-axis.9
The necessary integration exercise yields:
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To evaluate this equation, the function f(x) needs to be defined. Thus, for illustrative
purposes assume that y = IMAX – x/4. The intercept here is the maximum amount of
sustainable economic rent that can be created in the water column above the richest
square unit area measured on the ocean floor. This maximum is assumed to be in the
center of the closed zone, which is probably a biologically reasonable assumption if
the closed zone is properly situated.
In this particular numerical illustration, the economic rent that can be created in


































This economic rent, V, is the maximum sustainable rent that can be created through
biological spillovers assuming fishers and other human users of the restricted zone
abide by the rules of the restricted zone. That is, they don’t partake of illegal activi-
ties that reduce economic rent below f(x).
Policing Activity
It is reasonable to assume that without policing activity, fishers and other human us-
ers of the restricted zone will engage in illegal activities, thus reducing the level of
sustainable economic rent. Support for this proposition is widespread (see Kuperan
and Sutinen 1998; Charles, Mazany, and Cross 1999; Nielsen 2003; and Nielsen and
Mathiesen 2003). We are now interested in the benefits of policing activity in the
restricted zone. If illegal activity occurs, rent is reduced below f(x) in figure 1.10
This cost is modeled on the simplifying assumption that the actual intercept, I, of
f(x) is below IMAX, the whole f(x) function shifting downward.
The cost of illegal activity in the restricted zone is calculated in two steps. First,




























Secondly, the change in economic rent for an effective downward shift in the inter-
















where DI has been substituted for DIMAX since the latter is a fixed quantity, but the




















In other words, a reduction in the intercept has a direct negative effect on the value
of sustainable economic rent.
10 Such illegal activity could be use of illegal gear (e.g., trawling in a no trawling zone) or harvesting
over a predefined TAC (that could be set to zero). According to, inter alia, Charles, Mazany, and Cross
(1999), illegal activity is likely to occur when its marginal benefit exceeds marginal cost. Marginal cost
includes the expected value of any fines, calculated as the probability of being caught and punished
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The optimum expenditure on policing effort depends on its respective benefits and
costs. The benefit of policing effort is the containment of the actual intercept, I, as close
as is possible to IMAX, subject to the constraint of policing cost. Letting the number of
police boats be the measure of policing effort, the total benefit of policing is:
TB = economic rent saved per police boat x number of police boats. (9)
A TB function reflecting diminishing returns to policing is shown in figure 3. Notice
that policing effort, POLX, coincides with VMAX, the maximum economic rent created
by the MPA (equation [5]).
The total cost of policing effort is:
TC = cost per boat x number of police boats. (10)
TC is drawn in figure 3 as a simple increasing linear function. Equation 10 assumes
that all policing costs are variable costs. Fixed policing cost, the cost of headquar-
ters for example, is easily incorporated as a positive y-axis intercept in figures 3 and
4. Several different compliance-monitoring methods exist, including shore-based or
buoy-based radar, aerial surveillance, sub-surface ‘pop-up’ buoys, the integrated
seabed hydrophone array, and on-board vessel monitoring systems that signal the
position of boats. As is discussed in NMFS (2003), the cost of operating these sys-
tems can vary significantly. It is assumed here that the policing authorities have se-
lected the most cost-effective policing technology.
It is indicated in figure 3 that the optimum number of police ‘boats’ (the mea-
sure of policing effort) is POL1, being determined where marginal benefit equals
marginal cost. Other noteworthy features of the equilibrium solution are: (i) the dis-
tance AB measures the net benefit of policing effort and (ii) VMAX – V1 measures the
sustainable economic rent lost due to continuing illegal activities. In other words,
Figure 3.  Optimal Policing EffortHallwood 490
given policing costs it is not optimal to maximize economic rent along f(x). This
agrees with a widely held view in economics literature on crime and punishment
that in the presence of positive marginal policing cost, it is not necessarily optimal
to eliminate all illegal activity (Becker 1968).
The Effect of Some Exogenous Events on the Equilibrium Solution
The forgoing discussion can be used to show the effects of three exogenous shocks
on optimal policing effort, the net benefit of policing, and the amount of sustainable
economic rent given up, respectively, when policing effort is optimized. Notice that in
figure 4 an upward rotation of TB1 to TB2 increases net benefit from AB to CD, reduces
lost economic rent due to continuing illegal activity from VMAX – V1 to VMAX – V2, and
reduces the total cost of policing from its level at B to its level at D. Clearly, anything
that causes the TB function to rotate upward creates several worthwhile benefits.
The factors than can cause an upward rotation of TB in figure 4, implying an
increase in rent saving per police boat, are as follows. First, better policing tech-
niques, or, the introduction of rules that make policing easier (e.g., requiring fishers to
constantly report their positions) will raise policing productivity. Since in equilibrium
there are fewer police boats at POL2, but more economic rent is protected from degrada-
tion, V2 > V1, rent saving per police boat must have increased. That is, each remain-
ing police boat will be intercepting a larger amount of illegal rent extraction.11
Secondly, rent saved per police boat may be increased through better education
of fishers and other human users of an MPA about the biological and economic dam-
Figure 4.  Effect of Greater Policing Productivity
11 Since productivity per police boat increases, this may create an incentive to use more police boats. How-
ever, net benefit of policing still increases, and economic rent lost due to continuing illegal activity still falls.Protected Areas, Optimal Policing and Optimal Rent Dissipation 491
age that illegal activities can cause. Charles, Mazany, and Cross (1999) and Sutinen
and Kuperan (1999) discuss the effect of moral values to be a good citizen on reduc-
ing illegal activity. Education about the objectives of fisheries management and the
contributions that individual fishers and other users of an MPA can make to improve
a marine ecosystem, can be thought of as bolstering moral awareness. Moreover, ac-
cording to NMFS (2003), because illegal activity is sometimes inadvertent, educa-
tion is valuable to simply inform potential visitors to an MPA about the existence of
restrictions. Assuming that such education reduces illegal activity, it is reasonable to
suppose that the remaining illegal fishing boats will be able to gather more illegal
rent per boat due to the relief from the external diseconomy of overfishing by the
other illegal fishing boats that have removed themselves.
The matter of the effect of a closed zone on aggregate harvests may be relevant
to the issue of policing costs, as acceptance of the rules of a closed zone is probably
more likely if aggregate harvests increase. If harvests decrease, as is the case in
many of the simulated bioeconomic models cited earlier, stakeholders may be less
willing to go along with the rules, probably behaving in ways that raise policing
costs. As Cooter and Ulen (1997) point out, efforts to create a social surplus, such as
the adoption of laws relating to an MPA, need to be seen as being reasonable as well
as rational if they are to be effective. Respected social norms may reduce external
costs without the need for legislation and attendant policing costs (Cooter and Ulen
[1997] offer the example of open-range cattle ranching in northern California).
Kuperan and Sutinen (1998) also acknowledge that fishing restrictions are more
likely to be obeyed by fishers if they are perceived as being ‘fair.’ Similarly, fisher-
ies comanagement, by giving fishers a say in the design and operation of a fisheries
regime, may increase compliance (see inter alia, Nielsen, Vedsman, and Friis 1997;
Holland and Ginter 2001; Eggard and Ellegard 2003; and Nielsen and Mathiesen
2003).
Thirdly, tougher laws against illegal activities will rotate TB upward in figure 4.
The argument here is similar to the previous discussion in relation to the effect of
better education. Thus, if tougher laws reduce illegal activity, rent saved per police
boat will increase. The counterpart to this argument is the well-known proposition
that if penalties are increased for any given probability of being caught, illegal ac-
tivity will decline as expected marginal benefit declines. Indeed, Kuperan and
Sutinen (1998) in their study of fishers’ behavior find empirical support for this hy-
pothesis.
Conclusions
This paper has considered some of the main biological and economic consequences
of MPAs. It began by pointing out that MPAs have been widely adopted in order to
protect marine environments in the face of overfishing. It was recognized that a key
consideration in the establishment of an MPA is the use of the correct biological
model, otherwise it may not be sited to maximize biological and economic payoffs.
Assuming that this issue is resolved, the paper went on to discuss the principles of
optimal zoning. Zones should be designed and policed so as to equalize the marginal
social cost of human activity between them. It was further argued that it is generally
not optimal to aim for MEY given that the policing of an MPA involves positive
marginal cost. Rather, some sustainable economic rent may have to be given up be-
cause the cost of catching the last (hopefully few) illegal human users is too high.
Finally, the economic model offered in this paper, which I have tried to base on
what is known about the relevant marine biology, suggests that as economic rentsHallwood 492
are likely to be created through biological spillovers to adjacent areas, these rents
may be worth protecting. Assuming that policing costs are not excessive, it would
appear sensible to design MPAs with buffer zones up against the exclusion zones.
Indeed, this design is used in the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park, but evidently it is
not used in U.S. waters.
References
Auster, P.J., and N.L. Shackell. 2000. Marine Protected Areas for the Temperate and
Boreal Northwest Atlantic: The Potential for Sustainable Fisheries and Conser-
vation of Biodiversity. Northeastern Naturalist 7(4):419–34.
Beattie, A., U.R. Sumaila, V. Christensen, and D. Pauly. 2002. A Model for the
Bioeconomic Evaluation of Marine Protected Area Size and Placement in the
North Sea. Natural Resource Modeling 15(4).
Becker, G.S. 1968. Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. Journal of Po-
litical Economy 76(2):169–212.
Bellwood, D.R., and T.P. Hughes. 2001. Regional-Scale Assembly Rules and
Biodiversity of Coral Reefs. Science 292(5521) 25th May:532–35.
Boersma, P.D., and J.K. Parrish. 1999. Limiting Abuse: Marine Protected Areas, A
Limited Solution. Ecological Economics 31:287–304.
Boncoeur, J., F. Alban, O. Guyader, and J. Thebaud. 2002. Fish, Fishers, Seals and
Tourists: Economic Consequences of Creating a Marine Reserve in a Multi-Spe-
cies, Multi-Activity Context. Natural Resource Modeling15(4).
Charles, A.T., R.L. Mazany, and M.L. Cross. 1999. The Economics of Illegal Fish-
ing: A Behavioral Approach. Marine Resource Economics 14:95–110.
Cooter, R., and T. Ulen. 1997. Law and Economics, second edition. New York:
Addison-Wesley.
Day, J.C. 2002. Zoning—Lessons from the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park. Ocean
and Coastal Management 45:139–56.
Demsetz, H. 1967. Toward a Theory of Property. American Economic Review Pa-
pers and Proceedings May:347–59.
Eggert, H., and A. Ellegard. 2003. Fishery Control and Regulation Compliance: A
Case for Co-Management in Swedish Commercial Fisheries. Marine Policy
27:525–33.
Farrow, S. 1996. Marine Protected Areas: Emerging Economics. Marine Policy
20(6):439–46.
Field, B. 1989. The Evolution of Property Rights. Kyklos 42(3):321–40.
Gordon, H.G. 1954. The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: the
Fishery. Journal of Political Economy 62(2) April:124–35.
Hall, D.C., J.V. Hall, and S.N. Murray. 2002. Contingent Valuation of Marine Pro-
tected Areas: Southern California Rocky Intertidal Ecosystems. Natural
Resource Modeling 15(3).
Hannesson, R. 1998. Marine Reserves: What Will They Accomplish? Marine Re-
source Economics 13:159–70.
Helfand, G.E., and J. Rubin. 1994. Spreading versus Concentrating Damages: Envi-
ronmental Policy in the Presence of Nonconvexities. Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management 27:84–91.
Holland, D.S. 2000. A Bioeconomic Model of Marine Sanctuaries on Georges Bank.
Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences 57:1307–19.
Holland, D.S., and R.J. Brazee. 1996. Marine Reserves for Fisheries Management.
Marine Resource Economics 11:157–71.Protected Areas, Optimal Policing and Optimal Rent Dissipation 493
Holland, D.S., and J.J.C. Ginter. 2001. Common Property Institutions in the Alaskan
Ground Fisheries Marine Policy 25:33–42.
Homans, F.R., and J. E. Wilen. 1997. A Model of Regulated Open Access Resource
Use. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 32:1–21.
Kenchington, R.A. 1990. Managing Marine Environments. New York, NY: Taylor
and Francis.
Knowlton, N. 2001. Coral Reef Biodiversity—Habitat Size Matters. Science 292,
25th May:1493–95.
Kuperan, K., and J. G. Sutinen. 1998. Blue Water Crime: Deterrence, Legitimacy,
and Compliance in Fisheries. Law and Society Review 32(2):309–37.
Macinko, S., and D. Bromley. 2002. Who Owns America’s Fisheries? Center for Re-
source Economics, Covelo, CA, Island Press.
Milon, J.W. 2000. Pastures, Fences, Tragedies and Marine Reserves. Bulletin of Ma-
rine Science 66(3):901–16.
National Marine Fisheries Service. 2003. Enforcement/Compliance Roundtable: Discus-
sion Summary—Madison-Swanson and Steamboat Lumps Marine Protected Areas.
www.nmfs.noaa/habitat/ecosystem/habitatdocs/enforcementsummary.pdf
National Research Council. 2001. Marine Protected Areas: Tools for Sustaining
Ocean Ecosystems. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
Nielsen, J.R. 2003. An Analytical Framework for Studying Compliance and Legiti-
macy in Fisheries Management. Marine Policy 27:425–32.
Nielsen, J.R., and C. Mathiesen. 2003. Important Factors Influencing Rule Compli-
ance in Fisheries: Lessons from Denmark. Marine Policy 27:409–16.
Nielsen, J.R., T. Vedsmand, and P. Friis. 1997. Danish Fisheries Co-management
Decision Making and Alternative Management Systems. Ocean and Coastal
Management 35(2-3):201–16.
OECD. 1997. Toward Sustainable Fisheries Management. Paris, France: OECD.
Pezzey, J.C.V., C.M. Roberts, and B.T. Urdal. 2000. A Simple Bioeconomic Model
of Marine Reserve. Ecological Economics 33(1):77–91.
Polacheck, T. 1990. Year Round Closed Areas as a Management Tool. Natural Re-
source Economics 4(3):327–54.
Rodwell, L.D., E.B. Barbier, C.M. Roberts, and M. McClanahan. 2002. A Model of
Tropical Marine Reserve-Fishery Linkages. Natural Resource Modeling 15(4).
Sanchirico J.N., and J.E. Wilen. 1999. Bioeconomics of Spatial Exploitation in a
Patchy Environment. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
37:129–50.
_. 2001. A Bioeconomic Model of Marine Reserve Creation. Journal of Environ-
mental Economics and Management 42:257–76.
_. 2002. The Impacts of Marine Reserves on Limited-Entry Fisheries. Natural Re-
source Modeling15(3):280–302.
Smith, J.D., and J.E. Wilen. 2003. Economic Impacts of Marine Reserves: The Im-
portance of Spatial Behavior. Journal  of Economics and Environmental
Management 46:183–206.
Sumaila, U. 2002. Marine Protected Area Performance in a Model of the Fishery.
Natural Resource Modeling 15(4).
Sutinen, J.G., and K. Kuperan. 1999. A Socio-Economic Theory of Regulatory Com-
pliance. International Journal of Social Economics 26.
Ward, T, D. Heinemann, and N. Evans. 2001. The Role of Marine Reserves as Fish-
eries Management Tools, Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries,
Bureau of Rural Services, Australia. www.affa.gov.au.